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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

C. EDWARD BUTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14353

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court of the Third Judicial District in
and for Salt Lake County, denying Plaintiff-Appellant injunctive relief and declaring
Section 23-2-1 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended,
constitutional and a valid ordinance of Defendant-Respondent City. This appeal was
brought for the sole purpose of determining the constitutionality and validity of said
section.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case came on before the Court on a hearing upon Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition
lor an Order to Show Cause, which hearing was heard and oral arguments presented. At the
conclusion of theDigitized
hearing
matter
was
advrsemenr
by the Court pending the
by thethe
Howard
W. Hunter
Law taken
Library, J.under
Reuben Clark
Law School, BYU.
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submission of memorandum briefs. The memorandum briefs were submitted and the Lower
Court, in a Memorandum Decision, ruled in favor of the Defendant-Respondent and
against the Plaintiff-Appellant granting no cause of action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is licensed as a taxicab operator in jurisdiction outside of Respondent City,
to-wit, Alta, Sandy, West Jordan, Utah, and Salt Lake County. Appellant also has an
exempt certificate from the Public Service Commission of the State of Utah. A substantial
portion of Appellant's business results from transporting passengers from the Salt Lake
City International Airport, which is located within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, to
the ski resorts of Alta and Snowbird for a fee. Appellant has no Certificate of Necessity and
Convenience issued by Respondent City, nor does he have any agreement with the Salt Lake
City International Airport for the conduct of commercial activities at said Airport.
Respondent requests the Court to find Section 43-2-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, Utah, 1965, as amended, constitutional and valid.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CITIES HAVE BEEN GRANTED THE POWER, BY
THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, TO REGULATE TAXICABS
DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE JURISDICTIONS.
Section 10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953, grants cities the power to, "license, tax
and regulate...cabs and taxicabs, and solicitors therefor;...and drivers of...cabs and
taxicabs and other public conveyances..." Likewise, city ctreets are under the jurisdiction
and control of the City. See, section 27-12-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
This Court has repeatedly held that,
"Where the power 'to regulate' a particular calling or profession is
conferred on a city, it authorizes such city to prescribe and enforce all
such proper and reasonable rules and regulations as may be deemed
necessary and wholesome in conducting the business in a proper and
orderly manner. To 'regulate' therefore implies the right to prescribe
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ogden City v. Leo, 54 U. 556, 182 P. 530, 532, 5 A.L.R. 960 (1919).
See also, Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 U.2d 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942);
Perry v. City Council of Salt Lake, 7 U. 143, 25 P. 739 (1891).
Very early in our state's history this Court held, in Perry v. City Council of Salt Lake,
that under Section 10-8-39 the City Board of Commissioners have a large discretion as to
whom a license shall be granted. The power to license, tax and regulate carries with it the
power to limit the number who will be licensed, i.e., that it can be granted to some and not
to others.
"Because the council may be authorized to license liquor sellers it does
not follow that they must license all who may apply." Perry v. City
Council supra, at P. 741.
In the Perry case the Court quoted from Crowley v. Christensen, 11 Sup. Rep. 13.
"There is not inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating
liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the
state, or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business
attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said,
be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as
will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of
regulations rests in the discretion of the governing authority. That
authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the
power of passing upon applications for permission to carry it on,
and to issue license for that purpose." (Emphasis added)
The Minnesota Court has put forth the proposition thusly:
"To do business upon public streets is not a matter of right
like the right of ordinary travel. Nor is the right to carry on
such a business to be placed upon the same basis as that of
conducting a lawful occupation upon private property within a
municipality. The use of public streets for private enterprise may
be for the public good, but, even so, it is a privilege that may
be granted, regulated or withheld. ...a municipality having the care
and control of its streets, and the authority to look to their
convenient and safe travel, may regulate and even exclude the
carrying on of a transportation business thereon for private gain,
or grant the privilege to some and exclude others, since no one has
a right as of course to carry on a private business upon the public
street." (Emphasis added) Shultz v. City of Duluth, 163 Minn. 65, 68,
203 N.W. 449, 450 (1925). See also, State v. Palmer, 212 Minn. 388, 3
N.W.2d 666 (1942).
Local consent to the operation of a taxicab is a condition precedent thereto. Lertner v.
Citizens Cab Co. of N. Y., 135 N.J.L. 608, 52 A.2d 687 (1947).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant cites Provo City v. Dept. of Bus. Reg., 118 U. 1,218 P.2d 675 (1950), for
the proposition that Respondent City has no jurisdiction over Appellant's cabs because they
operate from Respondent City to sites outside of said City. However, that case involves the
question of who has jurisdiction over controversies involving street and railroad crossings.
This Court decided, based upon statutory interpretation, that it was the Public Service
Commission. That case was so decided because the legislature had so legislated. At page 679
of the Opinion this Court stated:
''Assuming without deciding that in the earlier acts which we
have quoted there existed some uncertainty as to whether cities
had been delegated the authority to deal with street-railway crossings,
all doubts were removed by the 1917 enactment. It is apparent
that at that date the legislature recognized that railroad-street
crossings presented distinct problems not posed by intra city
operations and that it intended the jurisdiction over them should
rest with the commission. Because the legislature may have at
one time authorized the city to control crossings would not
prevent a subsequent legislature from revoking the grant and vesting
the authority in a state agency. The wording of the 1917 act
was so clear and explicit that if it be contended the city had
been delegated the power prior to that time then the subsequent
enactment repealed the former."
In the case at hand, we have exactly the opposite situation as in the Provo case. The
Legislature has expressly denied the Public Service Commission any right to regulate
taxicabs that operate within a fifteen mile radius of a city. Section 54-6-12(f), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, specifically provides that no portion of the Motor Vehicle Transportation
Act (except as to matters not involved herein) shall apply, "(f) to motor vehicles...when,
used as...licensed taxicabs, operating within a fifteen mile radius of the limits of any city..."
This power is specifically given to cities by Section 10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated 1953. As
one can readily see, the Legislature has specifically granted to the cities the right to control
taxicabs operating within the city; thus, the case at hand is clearly distinguishable from the
Provo case.
A second case cited by Appellat is Parker v. Provo City,

U.2d

, 543

P.2d 769 (1975), which is also clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the Parker
case there was no express grant to cities regarding the subject matter of that case; therefore,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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authority to cities) to see if the right had been granted under that section. It was decided
that it did not come under that section because it was not indispensable to the purpose and
objects of the city to prohibit persons from waste removal and that there was no showing
that it was in any way related to the protection of the public health, safety, welfare and
well-being; hence, Defendant exceeded its authority by enacting the ordinance in question.
In the case before this Court there is a specific grant of authority given by Section 10-8-39,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and for that reason there is no need to look to Section 10-8-61
and this case is clearly distinguishable from the Parker case.

POINT II
THERE IS A DIRECT INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC TO
REGULATE TAXICABS.
The very purpose of licensing is the regulation of the character and standard of service
to be performed on city streets. To that end cities may require a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity. It is well recognized that the regulation of the use of the highways for private
gain rests upon the principle of public convenience and necessity.
"The principle applied in the regulation of the use of the
highways for private enterprise rests upon public convenience and
public necessity, a principle recognized and in a large degree
applied by the national government in placing the control and
regulation of the railroads of the country in the hands of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Title 49, 'Transportation,' c.l,
§ 1, p. 1649, U.S.C. 1936.
"It was upon this theory and the application of this principle
that this court in Ex parte Tendall, 102 Okl. 192, 229 p. 125, held that
the state was within the rightful exercise of its police power
in the regulation of the use of the highways in sustaining
the constitutionality of the law here again challenged, and denied
that if in any wise was a contravention of either the Fourtheenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution as in abridgment of any
right or privilege of the citizen, or in deprivation of property
without due process of law." Barbour v. Walker, 126 Okl.
1227, 259 P. 552, 554, 56 A.L.R. 1049 (1927).
One of the principal reasons for requiring a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity is
to assure adequate transportation to the public. This is done to assure that competition will
i
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"Its (requirement of Certificate of Necessity and Convenience)
purpose is to regulate competition, so that each community will
have adequate transportation facilities, and yet protect the shippers
and public from the baleful results of excessive compeititon."
Cantlay & Tanzola v. Public Service Commission, 120 U. 217, 233
P.2d344, 346(1951).
The requirement for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity is also for the purpose
of insuring that only qualified persons undertake the performance of such services to the
public, i.e., those who are morally and financially responsible to the protection of public
welfare. Kramer v. Haley, 250 Or. 87, 439 P.2d 571 (1968).
The regulation of taxicab business has a direct relation to the safety of citizens within
a city. This is to insure that the vehicles used in such service are maintained at a sufficient
safety standard, as well as that the drivers of such vehicles are competent, capable and
qualified in the operation thereof.
"One of the principal purposes of our statutes pertaining to
the regulation of motor carriers of persons and property is
to have the motor vehicles operated in such a way as to
promote the safety and welfare of the public." Briggs v. Burk,
172 Kan. 375, 239 P.2d 981 (1952).
The efficient and safe operation of taxicabs is a matter of grave concern to the people
of the city. The regulation thereof and the fixing of rates contributes directly to the
maintenance of safe standards of service. The state not having occupied this field,
municipalities may do so in the exercise of police powers. Ex parte Martinez, 56 Cal. App.
2d 473, 132 P.2d 901 (1942).

POINT III
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM AN ORDINANCE TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BASED UPON SOME HYPOTHETICAL
CASE OR WHERE IT MIGHT VIOLATE A THIRD PARTIES
RIGHTS.
Appellant makes quite a to-do about the City's ordinance being in conflict with and
repugnant to the Utah Motor Transportation Act (Chapter 6 of Title 54, Utah Code
Annotated 1953). Appellant's operation is specifically exempted from that Act as previously
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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discussed in Point I. What Appellant is doing is posing a hypothetical case and saying that
someone else's rights may possibly be violated. This he cannot do. Suffice it to say, that a
person cannot challenge the constitutionality of a law on the grounds that it impairs the
rights of others, but must show that it is unconstitutional as to his own conduct or situation.
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 87 L.ed. 603, 63 S.Ct. 493 (1943); Bourjois v. Chapman,
301 U.S. 183, 81 L.ed. 1027, 57 S.Ct. 691 (1937); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 6
L.ed. 2d 393, 81 S.Ct. 1101 (1961); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L.ed. 2d 524, 80
S.Ct. 519 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 97 L.ed. 1586, 73 S.Ct 1031 (1953). See
also, 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 112, 122 and 123, and cases cited therein.
Appellant does not have a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity issued by the
Public Service Commission of Utah to serve statewide, countywide or indeed to operate
anywhere except as is granted by a city.

POINT IV
REGULATION OF TAXICABS WITHIN JURISDICTION OF CITY
DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
It is a basic rule of construction that ordinances should be construed and applied as to
make them constitutional whenever possible rather than the contrary and not to strike down
any ordinance unless necessary. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Dist. Corp., 2 U.2d 256,
272 P.2d 177 (1954); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 4 L.ed 2d 1435, 80S.Ct. 1367
(1960).
There is no constitutional right to use the streets for private gain. ''So far as I have
been able to discover, the authoriies are overhwelmingly to the effect that he has no
inherent, no constitutional right to carry on such a business." (Several cases from various
jurisdictions cited) Cutrona v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 14 Del. Ch. 208, 124 A.
658, 662 (1924).
The transportation of passengers for hire upon the streets of the city is not an inherent
right guaranteed under the constitution, but is a privilege which a city may allow or refuse.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Courtesy Cab Co. v. Johnson, Wis. 2d, 426 103 N.W.2d 17 (1960). The use upon the
public highways of motor vehicles engaged in transportation for hire may be prohibited,
restricted, or conditioned by the controlling public authority. Stephenson v. Binford, 287
U.S. 251, 77 L.ed. 288, 53 S.Ct. 181, 87 A.L.R. 721 (1932); Continental Baking Co. v.
Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 76 L.ed. 1155, 52 S.Ct. 595, 81 A.L.R. 1402 (1932).
It is a universally accepted doctrine that the use of the public roads for the conduct of
business thereon is an extraordinary use, and, as such, is enjoyed not as a right but as a
privilege. That the state may altogether exclude any hauling by a carrier, common or
contract intrastate from its roads, is generally taken for granted. Stephenson v. Binford,
supra. In Peoples Taxicab Co. v. City of Wichita, 140 Kan. 129, 34 P.2d 545, 95 A.L.R.
1218 (1934), it was held that a city has broad powers to regulate the operation of taxicabs
upon its streets, and that an ordinance doing so will not be held to be invalid unless it
appears to be unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary. See also, City of Wichita v. Demers,
117 Kan. 735, 291 P.2d 1106 (1955). There is a distinct difference between the right of the
citizens to use the streets for the purposes of travel and transportation either for business or
pleasure in the ordinary and customary manner as discussed by Appellant in his brief and
the extraordinary right of using the streets for the business of a common carrier for gain.
The former cannot be prohibited, but the latter can.
'The streets and highways belong to the public. They are
built and maintained at public expense for the use of the
general public in the ordinary and customary manner. The state,
and the city as an arm of the state, has absolute control of
the streets in the interest of the public. No private individual or
corporation has a right to the use of the streets in the prosecution
of the business of a common carrier for private gain without
the consent of the state, nor except upon the terms and conditions
prescribed by the state or municipality, as the case may be.
The use of the streets as a place of business or as a main
instrumentality of business is accorded as a mere privilege, and
not a matter of natural right. " (Emphasis added) Hadfield v. Lundin,
98 Was. 657, 168 P. 516, 517 (1917).
The Court further stated, at page 571:
"/T/he sovereign state has plenary control of the streets and
highways, and, in the exercise of its police power, may absolutely
prohibit the
use of the streets as a place for the prosecution
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the court) all recognize the fundamental distinction between the
ordinary right of a citizen to use the streets in the usual
way and the use of the streets as a place of business or main
instrumentality of a business for private gain. The former is
a common right, the latter and extraordinary use. As to the
former the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter
it is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the
use of the streets by a common carrier in the prosecution
of its business as such is not a right, but a mere license or
privilege, it follows that the legislature may prohibit such use entirely
without impinging any provisions either of the state or federal
Constitution." (Emphasis added.) Hadfield v. Lundin, supra.
Since the state has a direct interest in the regulation of common carriers, i.e., for the
protection of its citizens so far as health, safety and welfare are concerned, doing so does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
"The use of highways by a common carrier is a
may be granted or withheld by the state in
without violating either the due process clause
protection clause." In re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d
24 (1958).

privilege which
its discretion,
or the equal
177, 331 P.2d

To the same effect, see also, Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 69 L.ed. 623, 45 S Ct. 324
(1925); Holmes v. Railroad Comm., 197 Cal. 627, 633, 242 P. 486 (1925); Escobedo v. State
Dept. ofMtr. Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1050); Schwartzman Service v. Stahl, 60
F.2d 1034 (D.C. 1932); Davis v. Commonwealth of Mass., 167 U.S. 43, 42 L.ed. 71, 17
S.Ct. 731 (1897).
For an excellent discussion of the constitutionality of regulating taxicabs, see, Ex parte
Tindall, 102 Okl. 192, 229 P. 125, 130 (1924) and Barbour v. Walker, 126 Okl. 227, 259 P.
552, 56 A.L.R. 1049 (1927).
This Court has held that the use of streets for business purposes can be licensed.
Western Auto Trans, v. Reese, 104 U. 393, 140 P.2d 348 (1943). Therein this Court, at page
350, stated:
"The type of business in which appellant is engaged entails a
use of the highways of the State of Utah in its performance.
Without the use of the highways it could not carry on its
business, and when it uses the highways of the State of Utah
by operating its vehicles thereon for the purpose of transporting
automobiles it is carrying on business within this state for the
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In Gilmer v. Public Utilities Comm., 67 U. 222, 247 P. 284 (1926), this Court held that
in exercise of the police power of the state a municipality can exclude all vehicles
transporting passengers or property from the streets or can impose such conditions as it
deems fair and just for such use. Therein this Court said, at page 288,
'The public streets and highways must necessarily be under the
control and regulation of the state or its authorized agencies. If
that be so, then it must follow that the state may regulate
and control their use by those who seek to use them as
common carriers for private gain."
If there were no controls placed upon common carriers, the persons using the streets
for transportation of persons or property could actually exclude the public from using the
streets for the purpose intended.
"We are here dealing with a case where one is using the public
streets and highways as a common carrier for private gain,
which streets and highways are constructed and maintained by the
public, by means of taxation and otherwise. If it be once
conceded that one may use the public highways for the purposes
aforesaid without the consent of the state, any number may do
the same thing, and thus those who seek to use the highways
for the purposes for which they are intended may be unduly
hampered in their use of them, or may be driven from them
altogether." Gilmer v. Public Utilities Comm., supra at P. 288.
Again in Bamberger Transp. Co. v. Public Service Comm.y 115 U. 274, 204 P.2d 163
(1949), this Court said that the use of highways by a carrier is subject to regulation and
control by the state. In speaking of the Gilmer case the Court said, at page 165,
"It was there held that the state has the right to regulate the
use of highways, and that no one has an inherent right to
use the public highways as a private business enterprise. Consequently,
the use of the highways by a carrier is subject to regulation
and control by the state. It was also held that when it appears
to the commission that an increase in a number of trips by
one carrier will seriously affect the ability of another carrier
serving part of the same territory or some territory beyond the
area in question, to render service, the commission may interfere
to prevent such result." (Emphasis added)
This case also stands for the proposition that if the financial ability of an authorized carrier
would be adversely affected, a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity need not be granted
to a new applicant. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT V
APPELLANT DOES BUSINESS WITHIN THE CITY, HE IS
SUBJECT TO SECTION 23-2-1, REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH, 1965, AS AMENDED, AND RESPONDENT
HAS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST TO PROTECT; THEREFORE,
RESPONDENT CAN PROHIBIT APPELLANT'S BUSINESS
WITHOUT VIOLATING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Appellant admits in his Complaint (see paragraph 6, page 2 of the Record) and in the
facts of his brief that "A substantial portion of plaintiff's business results from transporting
passengers from Salt Lake City's International Airport which is within the corporate limits
of Salt Lake City..." See page 1, Appellant's Brief. This is not an occasional or isolated
incident, but a "substantial" conducting of taxicab business within the City. The City has a
legitimate interest in the type and character of persons who engage in taxicab business
within the City, to the extent that they may require a permit even for traveling through the
City. Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99, 96 L.ed. 775, 72 S.Ct. 502 (1952). A municipality may
regulate both taxicabs bringing passengers into, as well as out of, said municipality. State v.
Gamelin, 111 Vt. 245, 13 A.2d 204 (1940). The Gamelin case involved both the situations of
carrying passengers from a point within the city to a point without, as well as from a point
outside of the city to one inside. There the court quoted In re James, 99 Vt. 265, 273, 132
A. 40, 44 (1926).
"The highways belong to the state (authorities omitted), and
are subject to the police powers of the state (authority omitted).
So, too, motor vehicles used as common carrier are subject to
the same powers, (authority omitted) While a citizen has the
right to travel upon the highways, and transport his property
thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, he can acquire no
'vested9 or 'inherent9 right to use them for commercial purposes.
The right, common to all, to the use of highways, is the ordinary
use made thereof, and by no means includes the special and
extraordinary use of a common carrier for commercial purposes
or private gain. The latter use the Legislature; in the exercise
of its police powers, may wholly deny, or may permit it to some and
deny it to others, as will best promote the general good of
the public." (Emphasis added)
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"She benefits regularly from the use of such streets and from
police protection while within the city. We know of no good
reason why she in turn should not be subject to regulation by
license for the protection of the people of Burlington as well as should
those whose similar business is conducted wholly within the city.
There is no discrimination against the respondent either in the
charter or the ordinance, nor does either attempt to regulate
that part of her business conducted without the city limits."

A license fee may be charged even though taxicabs are licensed in another jurisdiction.
Town ofFlemming v. Wright, 225 Ky. 123, 7 S.W.2d 832 (1928). Taxicabs may be denied
the privilege of picking up fares in a city for transportation to another city or to the county.
See, Barton v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 214 Md. 359, 135 A.2d 442, 445
(1957).
The purpose of certifying taxicabs under a Certificate of Necessity and Convenience is
to control the number of taxicabs operating within a city. If taxicabs licensed in another
jurisdiction are allowed to come into the city to pick up passengers without being licensed
therefor, this would increase by indirection the number of cabs licensed in a city. Further, it
would be impossible to supervise operation of cabs licensed elsewhere to make sure they
were up to safety standards as well as all other protections required by the city. As was
stated in the Barton case, at page 445:
"Conditions in a congested metropolis, with its concentration
of people and vehicles, and the foreseeable evils and dangers
implicit in an excess of cabs, with resulting overeager competition
for fares, come readily to mind as factors which may have
led the Commission to limit the number of taxicab permits
in Baltimore City and to deny additional competitive rights to
Baltimore County cabs."

It is true that the Salt Lake City International Airport does generate a substantial and
lucrative business for taxicabs. It is a very congested area with great concentrations of
people and vehicles and the competition for fares is great at that facility. Particularly, this is
true with regard to the very lucrative transportation of persons to the ski resorts. Allowing
taxicabs licensed in a jurisdiction outside of Salt Lake City to operate at the Salt Lake City
International Airport
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control over those taxicabs. Cities outside of Salt Lake City would also have no real interest
in regulating such taxicabs inasmuch as the majority of their business would be obtained
from Salt Lake City. Such a city's interest would be in obtaining revenue from the licensing
fee. Further, persons such as Appellant could and do charge a cut rate fee which results in a
disarrangement of competitive conditions disadvantageous to the public interest. Appellant
benefits from the use of the streets, which the City must maintain, and from police
protection while within the City and should be required to pay a license fee therefor. Such is
true whether a taxicab company solicites business on the streets or the service is requested
over the telephone and even though such taxicab's office is outside of the city. See, Chicago
v. Dorband, 297 111. App. 617, 18 N.E.2d 107, 109 (1938).
A foreign corporation carrying passengers from a point within the State to a point
without the State is doing business in the State. Camas Stage Co. v Roger, 104 Or. 600, 209
P. 95, 99, 104, 25 A.L.R.27 (1922). When a trucking company was hauling sand and gravel
between Fort Knox and West Point over a route which traversed through Louisville, the
court held that the City of Louisville could impose a license tax upon such company for the
use of its streets. Roger v. City of Louisville, 296 Ky. 238, 176 S.W.2d 387 (1943). Such was
the case, even though the company stated that such hauling would be done over a period of
only three months.
CONCLUSION
There is no merit whatever to Appellant's contention that the City's ordinance is
unconstitutional. Courts throughout the land have held that a municipality has the right,
whether through statutory power or through its police power, to regulate common carriers
within their respective jurisdictions. Appellant conducts a substantial portion of his business
within the jurisdiction of Respondent City, but claims that he cannot be regulated by said
City because he is licensed in another city. But, the Respondent has the right to protect its
citizens to insure adequate and safe public transportation, and it is within its power to do
so.
For these reasons, Salt Lake City's ordinance cannot be said to be beyond the power of
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left the control of taxicabs to the respective cities wherein they are operating. It is further
obvious that the Legislature intended that the cities be allowed to regulate taxicabs which
are transporting persons for hire to points beyond the City limits. This is evident by the fact
that taxicabs operating within a fifteen mile radius of the city in which they are licensed are
not required to obtain Public Service Commission authority to operate. The intent of the
legislature could never have been to the effect that taxicabs licensed in one jurisdiction may
operate in another without being licensed therein merely because that city is within a fifteen
mile radius of the city in which they are licensed. As can readily be seen, this would allow
taxicabs to enter a jurisdiction and operate without any controls or regulations whatsoever
by the city they operate in.
Therefore, it is respectfully

submitted that the ordinance of Respondent is

constitutional and valid. For this reason, it is respectfully requested that this Court so
declare.
ROGER F. CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney
O. WALLACE EARL
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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